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Introduction 
 
Since the invention of the Himalaya clauses, disputes have arisen in terms of their scope, 
interpretation and validity. This has largely impaired the efficiency of the clauses. In 2010, 
the International Group of P&I Clubs (IG P&I) and BIMCO reviewed the use of Himalaya 
clauses in bills of lading and other contracts. The aim of the revision was to produce a 
clause which would be recognised and given effect to in most of the major jurisdictions, in-
cluding the US and the UK. In September 2010, a newly drafted clause (2010 clause), to-
gether with the key features and intended effects of the clause, was circulated to all mem-
bers of BIMCO and to all clubs within the IG P&I.1 In 2014, the 2010 clause was amended 
and circulated again,2 and it was suggested that it be read in conjunction with the key fea-
tures and intended effects set out in the 2010 circular. In 2016, this new Himalaya Clause 
(2016 clause) was finally incorporated into BIMCO's 2016 standard form of bills of lading.3 
The 2016 clause is constituted of five sub-paragraphs. Compared with previous Himalaya 
clauses, it has made changes in respect of both the content and structure. This commen-
tary evaluates the clarifications and potential legal effects brought by these changes. 
 
The scope of third parties protected 
 
Similar to most of the shipping companies' own terms of carriage and BIMCO's previous 
standard form of bills of lading, the 2010 clause gave the Himalaya-type protection to any 
servant, agent and independent contractor employed by or on behalf of the carrier. How-
ever, in the US, there had been authorities where the cargo claimants sued the ship man-
agers to avoid the defences and limitations under the US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
1936.4 Therefore, the US legal adviser suggested that the 2010 clause should be 
amended to make it clear that the protections are to be extended to the ship managers. 
This led to the addition of sub-paragraph (a) of the 2016 clause, which was specially de-
signed to define the third parties protected by the clause. It uses the term 'servant' to refer 
to the third parties who are to be protected and, for the first time, enumerates them in de-
tail, with an express reference to the 'managers and operators of vessels'. Also, by includ-
ing 'underlying carriers' as one of those third parties, the 2016 clause can be better used in 
multimodal transport, where more than one actual carrier is usually involved in performing 
the carriage of goods. 
Sub-paragraph (a) also provides that, for a third party to be protected by the clause, it does 
not matter whether he is 'in direct contractual privity with the Carrier or not'. This presuma-
bly codifies the decision of the US Supreme Court in Norfolk Southern Railway Co v 
James N Kirby Pty Ltd5 that 'any independent contractor' should not be interpreted in a 
narrow way and there was no justification in interpreting it as an independent contractor 
 who was only in direct privity with the contracting carrier. The phrase was accordingly held 
to embrace the sub-sub-contractor,6 who was a railroad carrier in that case.7 
 
General exemption clause 
 
Sub-paragraph (b) of the 2016 clause is a classic general exemption clause, which totally 
exempts a third party from liability for any loss of, damage to or delay in delivery of the 
goods. It is in essence no different from what has often been used in practice.8 However, 
the crucial change to this provision is actually brought by sub-paragraph (e) of the 2016 
clause. Under the previous Himalaya clauses, it was not clear whether the agency part and 
deeming provision applied to the general exemption clause or not. This led to uncertainty 
on whether a third party could enforce a general exemption clause pursuant to the com-
mon law Himalaya clause approach. Sub-paragraph (e), by expressly applying the agency 
part and deeming provision to each of its previous sub-paragraphs, including the general 
exemption clause, clarifies that the general exemption clause can be enforceable by the 
third parties themselves by virtue of an efficient Himalaya approach. This reflects the 
House of Lords' decision in The Starsin9 that the Himalaya mechanism could be applicable 
to the general exemption clause, just as it was applicable to extending the carrier's exclu-
sions and limitations to third parties. 
 
Extending the carrier's rights to third parties 
 
Sub-paragraph (c) of the 2016 clause extends the rights, exemptions, defences and im-
munities applicable to the carrier to the third parties employed by him. In this aspect, it is 
not different from a traditional Himalaya clause. However, what is new is that it specifically 
includes 'the right to enforce any jurisdiction or arbitration provision' as one of the benefits 
extended to the third parties. This is probably a reaction to The Mahkutai,10 where the 
Privy Council held that the Himalaya clause gave 
 
third parties only the rights which benefited one of the parties to it, while an exclusive juris-
diction clause was a 'mutual agreement' creating 'mutual obligations', so it could not be ex-
tended to third parties.11 Presumably, this reason can be equally applicable to an arbitra-
tion clause.12 It has been submitted that The Mahkutai was decided upon a construction of 
the particular Himalaya clause used in that case, which only gave the third parties 'the 
benefit of all exceptions, limitations, provisions, conditions and liberties benefiting the Car-
rier'.13 Therefore, a Himalaya clause might be redrafted to extend the benefit of an exclu-
sive jurisdiction clause14 and an arbitration clause.15 The 2016 clause, by making a specific 
reference to the jurisdiction clause and arbitration clause, may potentially extend the bene-
fit of an exclusive jurisdiction clause or an arbitration clause to a third party under English 
law.16 In the US, even without this specific reference, a forum selection clause has been 
held to be a 'defence' which could be enforceable by a third party.17 Some of the shipping 
companies' own terms of carriage, although expressly entitling the third parties to enforce 
the jurisdiction clause in the bill, make no reference to the arbitration clause.18 This is be-
cause, in their bills of lading, it is jurisdiction clauses, rather than arbitration clauses, that 
are normally used. 
 In the UK, even if the Himalaya clause specifically extends the benefit of an arbitration 
clause to a third party so that he is entitled to claim the benefit of that clause, a problem 
still exists as to whether he may enforce it by applying for a stay of proceedings pursuant 
to section 9 of the Arbitration Act 1996. This is because that section requires that the per-
son who applies for a stay of proceedings be already a 'party to the arbitration agreement', 
while a servant, agent or independent contractor of the carrier is not a party to the arbitra-
tion agreement.19 Arguably, this difficulty could be dealt with in either of the following two 
ways. One possible argument is that in cases where the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 
Act 1999 (the 1999 Act) applies, the situation falls within section 8(2): by making a specific 
reference to the arbitration provision, the Himalaya clause in the bill of lading confers on 
the third party a procedural right to arbitrate a tort claim made by the cargo interests.20 Ac-
cording to section 8(2), if the cargo interests sue the third party in court, the latter has the 
right to choose whether to enforce his right to arbitrate; if he chooses to exercise that right, 
and if the arbitration provision in the bill of lading is 'in writing',21 he 'would be treated for 
the purposes of that Act as a party to the arbitration agreement', so as to be able to apply 
for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 9 of the Arbitration Act 1996.22 The other pos-
sible argument is that the common law Himalaya clause approach operates by creating a 
contract between the cargo claimant and the third parties for the purpose of enforcing the 
benefits.23 In this sense, it can be said that a servant, 
 
agent or independent contractor is a party to the arbitration agreement for the purpose of 
enforcing the benefit of that agreement. If this is correct, he may apply for a stay of pro-
ceedings under section 9 of the Arbitration Act 1996 if sued by the cargo interests in court. 
 
Promise not to sue clause 
 
Sub-paragraph (d) of the 2016 clause contains what can be traditionally read as a promise 
not to sue clause (sub-paragraph (d)(i)), under which the merchant promises that he would 
not sue the third parties employed by the carrier. It also embodies an indemnity provision 
(sub-paragraph (d)(ii)), which provides that had the merchant nevertheless sued the third 
parties, he would indemnify the carrier against all consequences. The combination of these 
two provisions is normally referred to as a 'circular indemnity clause'. Previously, it had 
been held that a promise not to sue clause could be enforceable only by the carrier by ap-
plying for a stay of proceedings.24 Sub-paragraph (d)(i) of the 2016 clause, however, apart 
from including the traditional promise not to sue clause, additionally states that the 'Serv-
ant shall also be entitled to enforce the foregoing covenant against the Merchant'.25 This 
additional phrase, by expressly giving third parties the right to enforce the promise not to 
sue clause, satisfies section 1(1)(a) of the 1999 Act, which allows a third party to enforce a 
term of a contract to which he is not a party if the contract expressly provides that he may 
enforce that term. Thus, in cases where the 1999 Act applies26 and where this 2016 clause 
is used, third parties employed by the carrier may enforce the promise not to sue clause 
pursuant to that Act. 
Just as it does to the general exemption clause, sub-paragraph (e) also expressly applies 
the agency mechanism and deeming provision to the promise not to sue clause. This may 
provide an answer to the doubt left by The Starsin – that is – whether a third party could 
 enforce a promise not to sue clause pursuant to the common law Himalaya clause ap-
proach. In that case, both the court of first instance and the Court of Appeal held that the 
provision relied on by the third party shipowners was a promise not to sue clause and that 
it could not be transferred to the third parties by the Himalaya mechanism.27 The House of 
Lords dismissed the decisions of the lower courts and held that the clause relied on by the 
third parties was actually a general exemption clause, which could be enforceable by them 
pursuant to the Himalaya clause.28 However, their Lordships did not explicitly decide (and 
they did not actually need to decide) on, if the clause at issue were a promise not to sue 
clause, whether the third parties could enforce it by virtue of the Himalaya clause. Now, 
subparagraph (e), by applying the agency part and deeming provision to the promise not to 
sue clause, makes it clear that a third party may enforce the promise not to sue clause 
through an effective Himalaya mechanism. 
 
Agency mechanism and deeming provision 
 
Like the traditional Himalaya clauses, sub-paragraph (e) of the 2016 clause similarly pro-
vides that the carrier acts as an agent or trustee for its servants, agents or independent 
contractors in entering into the benefits (the agency mechanism), and that such servants, 
agents and independent contractors are deemed to be parties to the contract for the pur-
pose of such benefits (the so-called deeming provision). However, the position and the 
technology of drafting the wordings of the sub-paragraph 
 
are different from the previous Himalaya clauses. Under a traditional Himalaya clause,29 
the agency part and the deeming provision usually appear immediately subsequent to the 
'extending the carrier's rights' part. This always gives rise to the misconception that a third 
party, by invoking the Himalaya clause, can only enforce the benefits within the 'extending 
the carrier's rights' part, but cannot enforce any other benefit, eg the general exemption 
clause or the promise not to sue clause. In contrast, the 2016 clause, by relocating the 
agency mechanism and the deeming provision to the end of the clause, and by using the 
all-inclusive words 'For the purpose of sub-paragraphs (a)–(d)', wholly clarifies that the 
agency mechanism and the deeming provision apply to all those sub-paragraphs prior to 
subparagraph (e). This, as has been stated in the 2010 circular, is to ensure that the 
clause 'operates as effectively as possible for the protection of its intended beneficiaries'. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The changes of the 2016 clause are responses to the litigation disputes arising from the 
use of old versions of Himalaya clause in different jurisdictions. The clause is a response 
to the various aspects of disputes by clarifying the scope of the Himalaya clause, espe-
cially the scope of third party beneficiaries and the transferable benefits. As IG P&I and 
BIMCO have declared, Himalaya clauses are very complicated and it is not realistic to pro-
duce a clause which can be effective on every occasion in every jurisdiction. This is also 
why the 2016 clause contains various instruments to protect third parties – in case one of 
the methods should fail. 
 This commentary submits that these changes and clarifications made by the 2016 clause 
can resolve some of the difficulties with the previous Himalaya clauses, but surely whether 
the amendments can be given effect depends on their judicial recognition by different juris-
dictions. Judicial recognition is awaited on the issue, for instance, of whether a third party 
can enforce the jurisdiction clause, arbitration clause and promise not to sue clause pursu-
ant to the 2016 clause under English law, or whether a third party can enforce the arbitra-
tion clause by applying for a stay of proceedings under the English Arbitration Act 1996. 
Also, there are some difficulties inherent in the common law Himalaya clause approach, 
which could not be resolved simply by a revision of the wordings of the clauses. These dif-
ficulties include, for example, the risk of a Himalaya clause's being invalidated by Article 
III(8) of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules30 and the inefficiency of the approach when the 
third party's act causing the loss or damage of goods occurs prior to the commencement of 
his employment.31 
An imperfection of the 2016 clause, which also exists in BIMCO's previous standard form 
of bills of lading, lies in that it fails to highlight the relevance of the principle of sub-bailment 
on terms. In almost every shipping company's terms of carriage, the carrier is usually given 
the entitlement to subcontract 'on any terms' the whole or any part of the carriage. By 
granting the carrier this right, the cargo owner is taken to have expressly consented to the 
sub-bailment of its goods to the sub-bailee 'on any terms', with the result that it will be 
bound by any terms of sub-bailment, unless the terms are unreasonable or unusual.32 
To sum up, the 2016 clause should be welcomed and members of BIMCO and IG P&I are 
recommended to amend their contracts of carriage to incorporate this 2016 clause, with 
the retention of the carrier's express right to sub-contract 'on any terms'. 
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